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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
ROBERT PAUL PACHECO, : Case No. 880281-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Issues, 
Statement of the Case, and Statement of the Facts are set forth in 
Appellant's opening brief at v-vi, 1-6. Appellant takes this 
opportunity to reply to Respondent's brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS (CLARIFICATION) 
Mr. Pacheco briefly replies to the State's statement of 
the facts in an attempt to clarify and otherwise correct potentially 
misleading characterizations of the facts. 
In the State's preparation of the Statement of the Facts, 
the State repeatedly claims Mrs. Luna's identification of 
Mr. Pacheco was unequivocal and that she was able to positively 
identify him. Brief of Respondent at 5-7. The State further 
contends that the detective involved in the case did not suggest to 
Mrs. Luna that she identify anyone in either photospread shown to 
her. Brief of Respondent at 6. For clarification, the positive 
nature of Mrs. Luna's identification of Mr. Pacheco was obtained 
only after a process fraught with impermissible police assistance 
suggestively guiding the identification. Within one week after the 
incident. Police Detective Lamont showed Mrs. Luna a photospread of 
driver's license photographs and Mrs. Luna was unable to positively 
identify the perpetrator (T. 61-62); she did, however, indicate that 
the photograph of Mr. Pacheco could be the person but that she was 
not sure (T. 62-63, 79). Detective Lamont affirmed that tentative 
identification by indicating to Mrs. Luna that she had in fact 
pointed out the right person (T. 64). Detective Lamont further 
informed her that the photograph was an older one and that he would 
return with a more recent photograph of Mr. Pacheco (T. 64). 
Within several weeks, perhaps a month later, Detective 
Lamont returned with a second photospread. This photospread was 
enclosed in a manilla folder labeled "fMUGf SHOW-UP FOLDER" 
containing six mug shot photographs—both frontal view and profile 
view—paperclipped in a manner to expose the frontal view photograph 
through six cut-out windows of the folder (Exhibit Six) (T. 65). 
Notably, Robert Paul Pacheco was the only individual repeated in 
both photospreads (T. 63-65, 72, 86). Further, before showing 
Mrs. Luna this second photospread, Detective Lamont informed her 
that the suspect was included in the photospread (T. 72). Mrs. Luna 
indicated that the only familiar picture she observed in that second 
photospread was the photograph of Mr. Pacheco (T. 72). 
Therefore, the State's assertion that the detective did 
not suggest to Mrs. Luna that she identify anyone in either 
photospread, while ostensibly correct, is suggestively misleading. 
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Further, it is similarly misleading to indicate in the Statement of 
the Pacts that Mrs. Luna's identification of the Defendant was 
unequivocal. 
The State also indicates in their Statement of the Facts 
that Mr. Pacheco was unable to articulate why he remembered April 7 
as the day he had loaned his car to his son, Troy. Brief of 
Respondent at 7. This is not true. Mr. Pacheco was able to 
articulate why he recalled April 7 as the day he had loaned the car 
to his son because of a phone call from his cousin (T. 119-20/ 
128). It was not the occasion of April 7 that created difficulty 
for Mr. Pacheco to recall but a second and irrelevant occasion when 
he had loaned the car to his son, Troy (T. 128). 
Along this line, the State further contends that 
Mr. Pacheco was somehow inconsistent in his testimony regarding 
whether the children accompanied Troy when he returned the car. 
Brief of Respondent at 7. This testimony is not inconsistent as 
alleged and, when read in context of the testimony, indicates 
nothing more than when Troy returned, Mr. Pacheco originally had no 
idea whether the children were with him; but later he asked Troy and 
was told that Troy had taken the children back to Heber City 
(T. 126-27). 
Finally, while recognizing that there is a family 
resemblance between Mr. Pacheco and his son, Troy, age twenty-two, 
the State subverts the facts by indicating that Mrs. Luna identified 
Mr. Pacheco and not Troy as being the perpetrator. Brief of 
Respondent at 7-8. This characterization is unfair and unwarranted 
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inasmuch as a photograph of Troy was not provided in the 
photospreads supplied to Mrs. Luna. 
SOMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the State's assertions, the quality of the 
photographs used in the two showups are not as telling as are the 
procedures utilized by the detective in reaffirming the 
identification of Mrs. Luna, the sole witness identifying 
Mr. Pacheco as the burglar. The processes utilized to obtain the 
identification was suspect and questions whether the identification 
was a product of memory or of the procedures employed such that the 
identification testimony of Mrs. Luna violated Mr. Pacheco's due 
process rights. 
Mr. Pacheco's constitutional rights of due process and a 
fair trial were violated when a mug shot photograph of Mr. Pacheco 
was admitted and published to the jury over the objection of defense 
counsel and where evidence of a prior conviction for Attempted 
Burglary reached the jurors. 
The circumstances surrounding this case indicate that 
Mrs. Luna's memory is far from remarkable. Based on the procedures 
utilized to obtain her testimony and the surrounding evidence and 
circumstances, insufficient evidence existed for reasonable jurors 
to conclude that Mr. Pacheco was the perpetrator of the burglary and 
theft involved in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES UTILIZED TO 
OBTAIN IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY AGAINST 
MR. PACHECO VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROTECTED RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS. 
The dispositive issue on this point is whether 
Mrs. Luna's identification of Robert Paul Pacheco as the perpetrator 
of the burglary of the Welch home is independent on its own merits 
or whether that identification was rendered unreliable and suspect 
by the suggestive processes utilized by police. The State suggests 
that the first photospread shown to Mrs. Luna consisted of 
photographs of such poor quality that she was unable to positively 
identify Mr. Pacheco, but once shown a better quality photograph, 
she was able to make that identification. Brief of Respondent at 
8-9. Later, the State contends that the first photospread of black 
and white photographs was not recent and the more recent photographs 
in the second photospread enabled the witness to make the 
identification. Brief of Respondent at 13. The State also 
exaggerates the nature of the identification, repeatedly referencing 
the identification as "unequivocal" and "positive," ultimately 
concluding the identification to be reliable under the totality of 
the circumstances. Brief of Respondent at 14-16. 
The State's analysis is incomplete and contrary to the 
facts. At a minimum, Respondent's position is overstated. The 
facts of this case disclose a genuine concern that the procedures 
employed by the detective were so suggestive that it is not possible 
to determine whether the identification was a product of the 
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procedures themselves or of Mrs. Luna's memory. 
The critical facts overlooked by the State are: Within 
days of the event, April 7, 1987, Detective Lamont approached 
Mrs. Luna with the first photospread containing black and white 
driver's license photographs (T. 77-78). Mrs. Luna was unable to 
positively identify anyone within the photospread as the perpetrator 
of the crime {T. 62, 79). She did, however, indicate that the 
photograph of Mr. Pacheco, a driver's license photograph taken in 
August of 1983, could be the person but that she was just not sure 
(T. 62-63, 79). At that juncture, it is critical to note that the 
detective informed Mrs. Luna that she pointed out the suspect 
(T. 64). He further indicated that he would find her a more recent 
photograph of the suspect (T. 64). 
Within weeks, Detective Lamont returned to Mrs. Luna with 
a second photospread which contained six mug shot photographs 
paperclipped in a folder marked in large black bold letters "'MUG1 
SHOW-UP FOLDER" (T. 65) (Exhibit 6-S). Upon showing Mrs. Luna this 
second photospread, Detective Lamont instructed her that the suspect 
was included in the photospread (T. 72). Again, it is critical that 
not only did the detective inform her of the suspect's presence in 
the photospread, but Mr. Pacheco was the only person whose 
photograph was repeated from the first photospread (T. 63-65, 72, 
86). In fact, Mrs. Luna herself commented that the only one she 
recognized from the first photospread was Mr. Robert Paul Pacheco 
(T. 72). 
Additionally, the second photospread presents additional 
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problems. Mrs. Luna admitted at trial that the second photospread 
did not contain pictures of others who reasonably resembled 
Mr. Pacheco. She agreed that most of those in the photographs were 
of younger individuals and that it was obvious Mr. Pacheco was much 
older (T. 66). The trial court also recognized the disparity in the 
ages of those in the photographs (T. 94). 
Even assuming that a problem existed with either the 
quality or the black and white nature of the photographs, which 
Mr. Pacheco urges the Court to reject as untenable, the fact that 
Mrs. Luna recognized him as being repeated from the first 
photospread and, more importantly, that he was the only person 
repeated from the first photospread contaminates the later 
identifications. Further contamination occurred when the detective 
instructed Mrs. Luna that he would bring a more recent photograph of 
the suspect whom she had tenatively identified and when he informed 
her that the suspect was included in the second photospread. 
These facts, overlooked and unaddressed by the State in 
its brief, indicate a legitimate concern that it is questionable 
whether the identification of Mr. Pacheco was a product of 
suggestive show-up procedures and the affirmations and 
reaffirmations of the detective or whether it was a product of her 
memory. In short, the procedures utilized to obtain the 
identification testimony of Mrs. Luna were so suggestive that they 
give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification resulting 
in a due process violation. 
The State also at length applauds the memory of 
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Mrs, Luna, particularly pointing out her ability to recall the 
license plate a year later when the case went to trial. Again, such 
a contention does not establish her ability to remember Mr, Pacheco 
as the individual who perpetrated the crimes in this case. If 
anything, when contrasting her recall of the license plate number 
with her inability just days after the event to select the 
perpetrator with any sense of surety, one should hazard to rely on 
that memory as a basis for incarceration. Also noteworthy is the 
fact that the other witnesses of the event all indicated the culprit 
to have been a much younger man (T. 21, 30, 42, 87), and one such 
witness, Mrs, Eward, actually identified a different individual 
other than Mr. Pacheco from the first photospread (T. 21). 
The State also urges that Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 
(1972), indicates that suggestiveness alone is not sufficient to 
suppress pretrial identification but rather the standard of 
examination is to be made under a totality of the circumstances. As 
the State conducts the examination of the five factors articulated 
in Biggers, this Court should note that the suggestive factors in 
the identification process themselves are absent from the analysis 
as well as the initial uncertain identification so soon after the 
events in question. When these considerations are factored in, the 
totality of the circumstances indicate the identification to be 
unworthy of reliance and violative of due process safeguards. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has recently criticized 
the five factors of Neil v. Biggers stating that "several of the 
criteria listed by the Court are based on assumptions that are 
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flatly contradicted by well-respected and essentially unchallenged 
empirical studies." State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986). 
Critical for this case, the Utah Supreme Court notably singles out 
the "level of certainty" factor of Neil v. Biggers stating: 
Research has also undermined the common notion 
that the confidence with which an individual makes 
an identification is a valid indicator of the 
accuracy of the recollection. In fact, the 
accuracy of an identification is, at times, 
inversely related to the confidence with which it 
is made. 
721 P.2d at 490 (citations omitted). In suggesting valid 
considerations for determining the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, 
the Utah Supreme Court replaced the "level of certainty" factor with 
the consideration of "whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was 
the product of suggestion." 721 P.2d at 483. Once the suggestive 
police behavior is factored into the analysis, the totality of the 
circumstances balance against the State and in favor of the position 
of Mr. Pacheco advanced herein. 
Finally, the State encourages that although Mr. Pacheco's 
photograph was the only photograph repeated in both photospreads, 
that fact does not render the process unduly suggestive and is a 
factor which alone is insufficient to justify such a finding. Brief 
of Respondent at 16. The State cites State v. Alvarez, 701 P.2d 
1178 (Ariz. 1985), for this proposition. However, State v. Alvarez 
actually states that "the fact that a defendant's photograph was the 
only one to appear twice was not necessarily fatal" (Id. at 1180; 
emphasis added), indicating, at least implicitly, that the totality 
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of the circumstances would then have to overcome the suggestive 
nature of the identification processes utilized. Mr. Pacheco 
insists that an examination of the totality of the circumstances is 
unable to overcome the taint of the identification processes 
employed by the police in his case. See Point III, infra, and Brief 
of Appellant at 13-16. 
Moreoverf Mr. Pacheco does not assert that the repetition 
of his photograph among both photospreads is the only error that 
occurred in the identification process. Mr. Pachecof as indicated 
above, also contends that the detective showing the photographs 
reaffirmed the initial unsure identification; that he promised to 
bring a more recent photograph of the suspect; and that he then 
informed the witness that the suspect was among the photospread. 
Each of these actions are additional factors alleged as violative of 
Mr. Pacheco's due process rights, as is the additional factor of the 
"'MUG1 SHOW-UP POLDER" itself (see Point II of Appellate's opening 
Brief and this reply). 
The primary evil to be avoided with suggestive showups is 
the likelihood of misidentification. In addressing this issue, the 
United States Supreme Court stated in Simmons their concerns and 
cautioned against several specific dangers which increase the 
possibility of this misidentification. Many of the dangers the 
United States Supreme Court warned against have occurred in this 
case. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). The 
United States Supreme Court explained when these abnormalities 
occur, "the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the 
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image of the photograph rather than of the person actually seen, 
reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent or courtroom 
identification." _Ld. at 383-84. 
Inasmuch as these and other recognized dangers occurred 
in this case, a violation of due process has occurred and this Court 
must therefore reverse the conviction of Mr. Pacheco and remand for 
a new trial absent the testimony secured through the suggestive 
identification process. Such a ruling would conform to the Utah 
Supreme Court's mandate: "Under the standard in State v. Perry, 
reversal is demanded where the identification is so unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that 
the defendant is denied due process." State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 
56, 59 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted). 
POINT II. EVIDENCE INDICATING PRIOR CRIMINAL 
BEHAVIOR BY MR. PACHECO ERRONEOUSLY REACHED THE 
JURY, PREJUDICING HIS RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY 
PAIR TRIAL AS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED. 
A. MUG SHOWUP POLDER 
The State distorts the nature of the exhibit challenged 
by Mr. Pacheco in this issue. The State asserts that: 
Though the placard in front of the photograph said 
"Salt Lake County Sheriff," the phrase was not 
sufficient to plant in the minds of the jurors the 
idea that the pictures were taken in the course of 
a previous arrest. Aside from the placard 
designation, the pictures have none of the 
characteristics which a juror would associate with 
an arrest photograph. The pictures showed no 
dates or numbers and contain only a full frontal 
view of the men, not the typical front and side 
view a person might associate with an arrest 
photograph. A juror looking at the photospread 
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could assume that the pictures were taken by the 
Sheriff's office purely for identification 
purposes. 
Brief of Respondent at 17. This observation is in error and 
contrary to the exhibit. The exhibit bears a title in bold black 
letters nearly one-half inch tall which states, "'MUG1 SHOW-UP 
FOLDER." This alone is enough to suggest the nature of the 
photograph, but, more importantly, the photographs show much more 
than indicated by the State. The placard in front bears the name 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office and contains a number (including 
the date) and an additional handwritten number. The exhibit itself 
contains six photographs of both frontal and profile views. While 
it is true that only the frontal view appeared in the window, these 
photographs were secured by six large paperclips and were easily 
accessible to being moved or the folder opened and looked inside to 
see the profile photographs. The record reflects that at some point 
this fear was a concern of both the Court and counsel, and some 
contemplation was given to a "don't mess with it" instruction 
(T. 60-61). An instruction, however, was not given and the jury was 
free to closely examine the folder either directly or inadvertently 
as paperclips can slip and the photographs easily adjusted. 
The State also misapprehends the status of Utah law on 
the issue of the admissibility of mug shot photographs. The State 
contends that in State v. Owens, 388 P.2d 797 (Utah 1964), the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a photospread containing 
mug shots. However, State v. Owens and a subsequent case, State v. 
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982), only peripherally address the 
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question at issue here. In State v. Owens and State v. McCardell, 
the Utah Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether mug shot 
photographs are too prejudicial and therefore inadmissible 
evidence. Procedural shortcomings prevented the Court from reaching 
the merits of that question in both cases. However, the Supreme 
Court notably commented in State v. McCardell that the appellant's 
claim of extreme prejudice "clearly [has] merit," though that issue 
was deemed unreviewable because of counsel's failure to object at 
trial. 652 P.2d at 946. Accordingly, the State is correct to 
assert that the case of United States v. Harrington, 490 P.2d 47 
(2nd Cir. 1973), and the three-prong test enunciated therein has not 
been adopted by a Utah appellate court. That assertion is true 
because Utah courts have yet to address the issue. Mr. Pacheco, 
however, urges that the Harrington standard is the recommended 
standard to protect both interests at stake in this concern. 
Addressing the Harrington factors, the State suggests 
that Mr. Pacheco brought into question the identification procedures 
utilized by the police, thereby allowing the admittance, or opening 
the door for the admittance, of the exhibit in question. 
Specifically, the State cites that, "Mrs. Luna was asked questions 
about the second photospread; specifically, whether any of the other 
men in the photospread looked like defendant" (T. 66). Brief of 
Respondent at 20. It is important to note, however, that before 
this question was asked of Mrs. Luna, the Court had already denied 
the objection of defense counsel (T. 59-60). Therefore, the defense 
did not open the door justifying the admission of the exhibit into 
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evidence but, rather, was responding to the earlier decision of the 
court. 
Concerning the second prong of the Harrington standard, 
the State suggests that the average juror does not have the capacity 
to understand the police procedures or to surmise prior criminality 
from mug shot photographs. Brief of Respondent at 20. This 
contention is also meritless. As indicated by counsel at trial 
prior to the ruling by the court, nearly every person in America who 
has ever watched a police/detective movie or television show 
recognizes the very common front and side view photographs with the 
accompanying placard to connote criminal behavior and bad 
character. Contrary to the State's assertion, the introduction of 
the photospread did draw undue attention to the source or nature of 
the photographs. A legend was clearly visible in the photographs 
through the window and more harmful information was readily 
accessible within the exhibit. 
Finally, the State suggests that the defendant and not 
the prosecution informed the jury that he was a convicted felon, 
contending, therefore, that any error with regard to the mug showup 
folder would be rendered harmless pursuant to the rules of 
evidence. Again, this assertion is erroneous. The admittance into 
evidence of the mug showup folder was introduced during the State's 
case-in-chief, and the discussion of Mr. Pacheco's prior Attempted 
Burglary conviction was not introduced until the defense case. 
However, as the introduction of the prior criminal conviction is 
also claimed error (see subpoint B infra), reliance on this error to 
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substantiate or validate the admission of the mug showup folder is 
untenable. 
Mr. Pacheco relies on United States v. Harrington and 
cases from other jurisdictions cited in his opening brief, Brief of 
Appellate at 20-25, to substantiate the serious prejudice which 
follows the introduction of mugshot photograph evidence. 
Mr. Pacheco, at this juncture, further urges that case law from this 
jurisdiction also recognizes the debilitating prejudice that occurs 
whenever prior conviction and other crimes evidence reaches the 
jury. See State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 14 n.l (Jan. 31, 
1989) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 
(Utah 1989); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988); State v. 
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1986); State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985); State v. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980); State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1979). 
A review of the exhibit and an examination of the case 
law reveal the highly inflammatory nature of the evidence presented 
to the jury and the accompanying prejudice to Mr. Pacheco's rights 
to a fair trial. Accordingly, this Court should recognize as error 
the admittance of the exhibit and reverse the conviction of 
Mr. Pacheco and remand for a new trial. 
B. PRIOR ATTEMPTED BURGLARY CONVICTION 
The State contends that despite the fact defendant filed 
an in limine motion to preclude the evidence of prior criminal 
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convictions, Mr. Pacheco is precluded from raising this issue absent 
a ruling on the record. Brief of Respondent at 22. The State cites 
no Utah case law to support this position. The State then cites 
Utah case law for the distinct proposition that the Utah Supreme 
Court will not rule on matters outside of the record. The record in 
this case, however, is sufficient to support Mr. Pacheco's claims. 
A motion in limine was filed pursuant to Rules 609 and 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence to prohibit the introduction of prior 
conviction evidence (R. 37). The record also reflects that the jury 
was instructed to limit the prior conviction evidence of Mr. Pacheco 
to the sole purpose of judging his credibility (R. 127). 
Mr. Pacheco asserts that the motion in limine filed with the Court 
and the accompanying jury instruction to limit the use of such 
evidence is sufficient record to preserve the issue for appellate 
review. 
To buttress this assertion, Mr. Pacheco cites State v. 
Seymour, 417 P.2d 655 (Utah 1966). In Seymour, the appellant 
claimed he was not represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing 
and contended error occurred when the trial court denied a 
subsequent motion to dismiss on that basis. The Utah Supreme Court 
indicated that indeed there is uncertainty in the record as to 
whether defendant had counsel at the time he waived preliminary 
hearing and ruled as follows: 
Inasmuch as there is no transcript as to what 
happened when that issue was presented to the 
district court, we normally should presume that 
what was said and done justifies the court's 
ruling. But in this instance, we set that aside 
and consider the more fundamental proposition 
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presented by defendant's appeal; Assuming that 
the defendant was without counsel when he waived 
preliminary hearing, is that a defect of such 
gravity as to invalidate his conviction? 
Id. at 657 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Mr. Pacheco contends 
that the nature of the error in this case is of such consequence 
that like the question examined in Seymour, this Court should find 
the record sufficient to justify reaching this issue. 
The State suggests that it is impossible for this Court 
to review the trial courtfs determination "if indeed one was made," 
urging the Court to not reach the issue. Brief of Respondent at 
22. Even assuming, arguendo, that the State is correct, this issue 
may still be addressed by this Court under the allegation of plain 
error. 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Verde, 101 
Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Feb. 3, 189), errors which are deemed plain error 
"are errors that we deem harmful, and although they were not 
properly preserved below, they are raised on appeal and we conclude 
that their erroneous character should be deemed obvious." In 
State v. Eldredge, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Feb. 1, 1989), the Court 
indicated that there are two requirements for a finding of plain 
error. First, from an examination of the record, the Court must be 
able to say that it should have been obvious to a trial court that 
it was commiting error. Second, and interrelated, is that the error 
must affect the substantial rights of the accused—that the error be 
harmful. 
In State v. Eldredge, the appellant contended on appeal 
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that findings of fact were not provided by the trial court in 
denying an objection regarding the hearsay statements of a child 
victim, in concluding that this error did not meet the first prong 
of the plain error requirements, the Court relied on the fact that 
an integral and leading decision, State v, Nelson, 725 P.2d 1355 
(Utah 1986), had not yet been decided. In Mr. Pacheco's case, 
however, substantial case law existed at the time of trial to have 
informed the trial court that the admission of a prior conviction of 
the same nature as the crime charged against the defendant is 
extremely prejudicial and reversible error. State v. Morehouse, 748 
P.2d 217, 222 n.2 (Utah App. 1988) (Jackson, J., dissenting 
opinion); State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1037-38 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Banner; 717 P.2d 1325, 1334-35 (Utah 1986); and Terry v. 
Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314, 325 (Utah 1984). 
In reviewing the second prong of whether this error could 
be deemed plain, reliance on the same cases establish that the 
substantial rights of Mr. Pacheco were violated when the jury 
learned that he had been convicted on a prior occasion of the same 
type of crime. In a line of cases culminating in State v. Saunders, 
699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court has 
continually recognized that evidence of prior crimes is presumed 
prejudicial inasmuch as the jury may then convict the defendant as a 
bad person rather than on the evidence presented before them in 
court. Buttressing this argument are the cases cited above, i.e. 
State v. Banner, wherein the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that 
perhaps the most prejudicial introduction of prior conviction 
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evidence is a similar crime wherein the jury then infers that if the 
defendant has committed the crime on a prior occasion, he more than 
likely committed it on this occasion. 717 P.2d at 1334-35. 
Accordingly, regardless of whether this Court deems the 
motion in limine and the related jury instruction sufficient to have 
preserved the issue for appeal, introduction of a prior Attempted 
Burglary conviction against Mr. Pacheco in this case is plain error 
and requires reversal. 
POINT III. THE EVIDENCE ADDOCED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS OF 
MR. PACHECO. 
The State maintains that the evidence adduced at trial 
was sufficient to support the convictions of Mr. Pacheco, primarily 
relying on the "remarkable memory of Mrs. Luna." Brief of 
Respondent at 25. The State again, in addressing this issue, 
referenced her identification as positive and without equivocation. 
Brief of Respondent at 23-25. As indicated in the Brief of 
Appellant and earlier in this Reply Brief, the characterization of 
Mrs. Luna's identification as positive and without equivocation is 
misleading. Further, the evidence does not support the contention 
that her memory is remarkable. 
Once again, the State did not factor into consideration 
the suggestive procedures used to obtain Mrs. Luna's identification 
testimony in analyzing this issue—the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Within days of the event, Mrs. Luna was unable to positively 
identify the perpetrator from the initial photospread (T. 61-62). 
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She did, however, tentatively select Mr. Pachecofs photograph, 
alleging that he could be the person (T. 62-63, 79). At that point, 
the officer reaffirmed the unsure identification, stating that she 
had in fact selected the suspect and that he would return later with 
a more recent photograph (T. 64). 
After several weeks, the officer returned with new 
photographs enclosed in a manilla envelope labeled "'MUG1 SHOW-UP 
FOLDER" (T. 65). The officer proceeded with the showing of the 
second photospread, instructing Mrs. Luna that the suspect was 
included among the photographs (T. 72). Mr. Pacheco was the only 
person who had been repeated in both photospreads (T. 63-65, 72, 
86); Mrs. Luna recognized this as well (T. 72). The subsequent 
identification of Mr. Pacheco by Mrs. Luna was therefore suspect and 
contrary to the concerns indicated in United States Supreme Court 
decisions and Utah case law. See Points I and II, supra. 
Mrs. Luna was able to recall at the time of trial the 
license plate of the blue and white car driven by the suspect. 
However, aside from this achievement, little else supports the 
State's claim that she possesses a remarkable memory. For example, 
besides not being able to make the positive identification within 
days of the event (T. 64), Mrs. Luna herself commented that she was 
not good at judging time (T. 64) and twice indicated she was not 
good at judging ages (T. 66, 69). Further, she could not remember 
whether all photographs shown to her in the first photospread were 
of hispanic suspects (T. 68). She was unable to recall whether any 
of those in the first photospread had moustaches (T. 69). She was 
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unable to recall from memory whether police had even asked her 
questions regarding the age of the perpetrator or the possibility of 
facial hair on the perpetrator (T. 69). Mrs. Luna also could not 
recall from memory how much time passed between the showings of the 
first photospread and the second photospread (T. 69). In short, 
contrary to the claims made by the State, the memory of Mrs. Luna is 
not at all that remarkable. It then follows that the 
identification, as either a product of her memory or the suggestive 
police process, is just not the stellar identification on which to 
sustain a criminal conviction. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized numerous evils 
inherent in an eyewitness identification. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1986). In State v. Long, the Utah Supreme Court outlined 
numerous problems both potential and real with the memory process 
itself and the ability of witnesses to accurately recall events. 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d at 489-91. The Court found that empirical 
evidence documented the unreliability of eyewitness testimony with 
countless studies "all lead[ing] inexorably to the conclusion that 
human perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited 
and fallible. • JEd. at 488. The Court further recognized that 
[p]erhaps it is precisely because jurors do not 
appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony 
that they give such testimony great weight. In 
one notable study involving a simulated criminal 
trial, 18% of the jurors voted to convict the 
defendant when there were no eyewitnesses to the 
crime. However, when a credible eyewitness was 
presented, 72% voted to convict. And, 
surprisingly, even when presented with an 
eyewitness who was quite thoroughly discredited by 
counsel, a full 68% still voted to convict. 
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Id. at 490 (citations omitted). As frightening as these statistics 
are, the Court additionally acknowledged that research established 
further problems of at least equal significance when eyewitness 
testimony is obtained through the use of suggestive police lineups, 
showups, and photo arrays. I^d. (citing R. Buckhout, Eyewitness 
Testimony, 15 Jurimetrics J. 171, 179-87 (1975)). 
Because of the concern that uncorroborated identification 
testimony of one eyewitness could serve as a linchpin in the 
prosecution case resulting in a conviction contrary to State due 
process strictures, the Court required in all such trials conducted 
after State v. Long that a cautionary instruction be given jurors to 
inform them of the potential problems with eyewitness identification 
testimony. State v. Long, 721 P.2d at 488, 492. While such an 
instruction was requested and given in this case, the factual 
preculiarities of the one uncorroborated eyewitness testimony, 
coupled with a panoply of suggestive influences by police, and when 
recalling the statistical propensities outlined above, this Court 
should recognize that no reasonable jurors could have found the 
evidence sufficient to convict Mr. Pacheco. Rather, the factual 
circumstances of Mrs. Luna's own testimony at trial more accurately 
indicates her identification of Mr. Pacheco was a product of the 
suggestive procedures used by the police officers and that the 
jury's verdict was a product of misunderstanding the nature and 
reliability of her eyewitness testimony. 
Accordingly, this Court should recognize as a matter of 
law that the identification testimony of Mrs. Luna is unable and 
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insufficient to sustain the convictions of Mr. Pacheco. This Court 
should therefore reverse those convictions for insufficiency of the 
evidence and remand the case with an order to dismiss the charges 
against him. 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, 
Mr. Robert Paul pacheco, requests this Court to reverse his 
convictions of Burglary and Theft and remand this case with an order 
either for dismissal of the charges or for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this c^& ~~ day of March, 1989. 
-<Mi-u± 
JAMES A. VALD^Z 
p e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
HHARD G. UDA} 
At torney for De fendant /Appe l lan t 
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